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1. Introduction
The principal-agent relation is the underlying source 
of many incentive problems in corporate finance. In broad 
terms, there are agency conflicts among various equity 
claimants (agency costs of equity), as well as between debt 
and equity claimants (agency costs of debt). La Porta, Lo-
pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) analyze the ex-
tent to which minority shareholder rights influence div-
idend policies around the world through their impact on 
the agency costs of equity. They find that strong share-
holder rights enable minority shareholders to obtain rela-
tively high dividend payouts from reluctant managers and 
controlling shareholders. Minority shareholder rights in-
fluence dividend policies by establishing the country-level 
balance of power between inside and outside ownership in-
terests. In this study, we posit that creditor rights influence 
dividend policies by establishing the country-level bal-
ance of power between debt and equity claimants. We ar-
gue that low dividend payouts serve as a substitute mech-
anism for weak creditor rights. Managers operating under 
weak creditor rights are more likely to consent to dividend 
restrictions through formal covenants and informal agree-
ments in order to build reputation capital and reduce fu-
ture financing costs. Our results confirm that the agency 
costs of debt play a significant role in determining divi-
dend policies around the world.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) 
propose two competing hypotheses for a causal relation 
between shareholder rights and dividend policy. The “out-
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come hypothesis” predicts that stronger rights will em-
power minority shareholders to obtain higher dividend 
payouts, and the “substitute hypothesis” predicts that 
weaker rights will lead to higher dividend payouts as man-
agers use dividend payouts as a substitute for weak inves-
tor protection. They find that the outcome hypothesis ex-
plains the empirical linkages between the agency costs of 
equity, minority shareholder rights, and observed divi-
dend payouts. In a parallel manner, we posit that the sub-
stitute hypothesis will explain the connections between the 
agency costs of debt, creditor rights, and observed divi-
dend payouts. Restrictive dividend policies substitute for 
weak creditor rights; that is, weak (strong) creditor rights 
diminish (enhance) the manager’s ability to pay out divi-
dends, all else equal.1 In addition to confirming the agency 
costs of debt version of the substitute hypothesis, our re-
sults also show that the agency costs of debt play a more 
pervasive role in dividend policies around the world than 
the agency costs of equity.
There is considerable variation in creditor rights across 
countries with similar legal origins and shareholder 
rights.2 For example, the US, UK, Canada, and Australia 
are all common law countries that tend to rank towards 
the top of the shareholder rights index. However, while the 
UK and Australia also rank towards the top of the credi-
tor rights index, the US and Canada rank towards the bot-
tom. The resulting contrast in country-level dividend pol-
icies is instructive. The typical UK and Australian firm is 
87% more likely to be a dividend-paying firm than its US 
and Canadian counterpart. Similarly, the typical UK and 
Australian firm pays out almost 2.80 times more dividends 
(as a percent of sales) than its US and Canadian counter-
part. Weak creditor rights lead to lower dividend payouts 
even after controlling for shareholder rights. We confirm 
this same pattern in subsequent tests using cross-sectional 
regressions, a much larger sample, and multiple control 
variables.
In their survey article, Denis and McConnell (2003) iden-
tify La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) 
study as the beginning of a new generation of research 
in international corporate governance. Numerous subse-
quent studies have examined the economic consequences 
of a firm’s legal and institutional setting. Country-level 
shareholder rights have been linked to corporate invest-
ment policies (Love, 2003); capital market development (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny1997; Morck, 
Yeung, and Yu, 2000; Wurgler, 2000); ownership structure 
(La Porta et al., 1998, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 
2000); expropriation (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer, 2000); corporate valuations (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002); cash holdings (Dit-
tmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003; Pinkowitz, Stulz, 
and Williamson, 2003); and dividend policies (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000; Faccio, Lang, 
and Young, 2001). All of these studies suggest that share-
holder rights affect corporate decisions because they pro-
vide the rules of the game for competing interests among 
disparate owners.
We extend this line of research by examining the abil-
ity of creditor rights to reduce the agency costs of debt. We 
claim that creditor rights will affect corporate decisions be-
cause they provide the ground rules for competing inter-
ests between debt and equity claimants. Previous studies 
have examined the impact of agency costs of debt on divi-
dend policies while, in effect, holding constant the creditor 
rights environment (Smith and Warner, 1979; Kalay, 1982; 
Easterbrook, 1984). However, the extent to which country-
level creditor rights determine dividend payouts is an open 
empirical question.
There are several reasons for creditors to demand addi-
tional control rights when creditor rights are weak. With in-
adequate legal protection, creditors are not confident in their 
ability to recover claims during bankruptcy proceedings. 
If a country’s bankruptcy law grants an automatic stay on 
assets, for example, this increases creditors’ costs of repos-
sessing collateralized assets. If creditors are not given abso-
lute priority over non-secured claimants during bankruptcy, 
their chances of full recovery are diminished. Similarly, some 
bankruptcy codes allow the distressed firm to unilaterally 
file for reorganization. Other codes allow incumbent man-
agement to remain in charge during prolonged bankruptcy 
periods. In such cases, creditors will be forced to negotiate 
with intransigent managers who have the motive and op-
portunity to threaten protracted bankruptcy proceedings in 
order to extract concessions.
If bankruptcy rights fail to provide adequate protection, 
creditors will demand greater control rights. Nini, Smith, 
and Sufi (2007, p. 1) show that “creditors draw from a tool-
kit of contractual covenants that can control or restrict 
nearly any dimension of corporate financial and invest-
ment policy”. Creditor control rights are strongest for firms 
with private credit agreements (e.g., bank loans, revolv-
ing credit facilities), as opposed to firms with access to the 
public bond market.3 They show that only 15–20% of pub-
licly traded firms in the US have access to the public bond 
market, and 95% of the firms still maintain some form of 
private credit agreement. These numbers are likely to un-
derstate the importance of private credit agreements and 
1 Esty and Megginson (2003) find that creditors are more likely to form large and diffuse syndicates when lending in environments with weak le-
gal enforcement of creditor rights. Creditors use these syndicates as a substitute mechanism for poor creditor rights.
2 The cross-country correlation between creditor rights and shareholder rights is 18% (p-value = 0.13) based on the 70 common countries that ap-
pear in both Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008).
3 Studies related to bond covenants based on the U.S. (Smith and Warner, 1979; Kalay, 1982; Malitz, 1986), the UK (Citron, 1992, 1995; Day and 
Taylor, 1996), Germany (Leuz, Deller, and Stubenrath, 1998), Australia (Whittred and Zimmer, 1986; Mather and Peirson, 2006), Canada (Thorn-
ton, 1992), and Finland (Niskanen and Niskanen, 2004) suggest that creditors indeed take preventive measures that directly and/or indirectly 
restrict dividend payouts. Direct restrictions typically include an upper bound on the total dividend amount over the life of the loan (Kalay, 
1982; Leuz, Deller, and Stubenrath, 1998). The upper bound increases with the level of earnings and the proceeds from new equity issuances, 
and decreases with the amount of previous dividend payouts.
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4 Not all dividend restrictions are contractual. John and Nachman (1985) argue that managers have an incentive to build reputation capital by re-
stricting dividends if they expect to tap credit markets in the future. Long, Malitz, and Sefcik (1994) provide supportive evidence for this repu-
tation-building mechanism. We nevertheless collect debt covenant provisions from a DealScan database for a subsample of countries (the U.S., 
UK, and Canada) from 1993 to 2006 in order to examine dividend restrictions. We exclude loans to financial and utility companies, and then 
compare the frequency of debt covenants in a low creditor rights environment (the U.S. and Canada) to the frequency of debt covenants in a 
high creditor rights environment (the UK). Our results show that 87.3% (78.8%) of U.S. (Canadian) loans contain dividend restrictions compared 
to 59.7% for UK loans. These frequency differences (i.e., U.S. versus UK, and Canada versus UK) are statistically significant (p-values < 0.001). 
We find similarly significant differences across creditor rights environments for covenants based on financial ratios and net worth restrictions. 
Taken together, this evidence supports the substitute hypothesis by showing that creditors demand more debt covenants, including dividend 
restrictions, as a substitute for weak creditor rights.
5 We find similar logit and Tobit results using total payouts (dividends plus repurchases) as the dependent variable.
creditor control rights for firms operating in non-US mar-
kets. Creditors have a stronger incentive to exercise con-
trol over corporate decision-making through private credit 
agreements when they operate in environments with weak 
creditor protection. In such circumstances, both creditors 
and managers are more likely to agree to dividend restric-
tions as a counterbalance to poor creditor rights.4
We test the substitute hypothesis for the agency costs of 
debt by constructing a large sample of 120,507 firm-years 
from 16,525 unique firms across 52 countries. The sample 
period spans from 1990 to 2006. We begin by examining the 
impact of creditor rights on the likelihood of paying divi-
dends while controlling for firm maturity, leverage, profit-
ability, sales growth, size, cash holdings, and shareholder 
rights. As hypothesized, we find a positive and significant 
relation between creditor rights and the probability of pay-
ing dividends. In addition to payout probabilities, we ex-
amine payout amounts. Our Tobit regression results show 
that creditor rights are positively related to divided pay-
outs.5 Weak creditor rights lead to dividend restrictions, all 
else equal. We find similar results for most of the individ-
ual components of the creditor rights index, including the: 
(1) right to repossess collateralized assets, (2) right to abso-
lute priority over non-secured creditors, (3) right to restrict 
the debtor from unilaterally seeking court protection, and 
(4) right to replace management.
We analyze the economic significance of our results and 
find that a reduction in the creditor rights index from its 
highest value (four) to its lowest value (zero) leads to a 41% 
reduction in the probability of paying a dividend. A sim-
ilar reduction in creditor rights leads to a 60% reduction 
in dividend amounts (as a percent of sales). In contrast, an 
increase in minority shareholder rights from its lowest to 
its highest value leads to a 25% increase in the probabil-
ity of paying a dividend and a 32% increase in dividend 
amounts. Cross-country variations in creditor rights have 
more explanatory power than cross-country variations in 
shareholder rights both in terms of statistical significance 
and economic significance.
After confirming the positive relation between creditor 
rights and dividend payouts, we examine additional im-
plications of the substitute hypothesis. First, we compare 
the propensity of dividend-paying firms from low and 
high creditor rights countries to omit a future dividend 
payment. The substitute hypothesis suggests that manag-
ers from low creditor rights countries will be more likely 
to omit dividend payments whenever debt repayments are 
in jeopardy. Our empirical results strongly confirm this 
hypothesis. Second, we examine the interaction between 
creditor rights and credit quality. Firms with high credit 
quality have less need to use restrictive dividend payouts 
as an alternative governance mechanism (i.e., as a substi-
tute for weak creditor rights). We posit and confirm that 
high credit quality reduces the influence of creditor rights 
on dividend payouts. Third, we analyze the interaction be-
tween creditor rights and free cash flows. The substitute 
hypothesis suggests that creditor rights will exert a stron-
ger influence over dividend payouts when firms have pos-
itive free cash flows. Again, our empirical results confirm 
this hypothesis.
Next, we test an alternative explanation for our empiri-
cal findings. It is possible that the positive relation between 
creditor rights and dividend payouts is driven by poor ac-
cess to external financing. If weak creditor rights discour-
age capital market development, then firms from such 
environments might pay lower dividends in order to fi-
nance projects from internal sources. We test this compet-
ing (though not mutually exclusive) hypothesis by ana-
lyzing the impact of dividend changes on firm valuations. 
Contrary to the prediction of this competing hypothesis, 
higher dividend payouts are not less value enhancing for 
firms from countries with poor creditor rights. Instead, our 
results confirm that creditor rights affect dividend policy 
through their impact on the agency costs of debt.
Finally, we run a series of robustness tests. We include 
additional controls for legal origin, rule of law, accounting 
standards, as well as stock market and credit market devel-
opment. We control for time-variation in the relation be-
tween dividends and firm-specific characteristics. We con-
trol for potential sample selection biases by replicating all 
regressions using numerous subsamples. We employ al-
ternative estimation procedures including Fama and Mac-
Beth (1973) regressions and country-mean regressions. In 
summary, all of our robustness tests verify that creditor 
rights play a significant role in determining dividend pay-
out policy.
Our study contributes to the corporate payout litera-
ture by proposing and confirming the substitute hypothe-
sis based on agency costs of debt. When a country’s cred-
itor rights are inadequate, firms use restrictive dividend 
policies as a substitute bonding mechanism. Our study 
also contributes to the nascent literature on creditor con-
trol rights. Contrary to “traditional thinking” in corporate 
finance, recent studies find that creditors exert significant 
control over corporate investment and financing policies 
(Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2007; Roberts and Sufi, 2007). We ex-
tend this growing literature by showing that creditors exer-
cise substantial control over dividend payout policies.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes our sample and variables. Section 3 analyzes 
our empirical findings, and Section 4 concludes the study.
2. Data and variable descriptions
2.1. Data sources and sample selection
Our primary data source for this study is Compustat 
Global. We obtain annual financial accounting variables, 
monthly market information, and monthly exchange rates 
from Compustat Global Industrial, Compustat Global 
Issues, and Compustat Global Currency files, respec-
tively. We collect country-level variables through various 
sources. We obtain creditor rights, shareholder rights, and 
legal origin from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) 
and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer. 
(2008)—two studies that update the La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) database. We obtain 
rule of law measures from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mas-
truzzi (2003). Our accounting quality disclosure scores are 
based on two sources, Hope, Kang, and Zang (2004) and 
Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003). The accounting 
disclosure scores are from the Center for International Fi-
nancial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). We construct 
stock market and financial intermediary development 
measures (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996) from the 
World Development Indicators CD-ROM produced by 
the World Bank.
We begin our sample construction by matching the 
Compustat Global Industrial database to the Compustat 
Global Issues database. We require that each firm-year ob-
servation in the annual Global Industrial file has: (1) fully 
consolidated accounting statements (consol = F in Compu-
stat Global Industrial), (2) membership in a non-regulated 
industry,6 (3) long-term debt, and (4) all the data fields re-
quired for subsequent analyses. After applying these filters, 
we obtain a sample of 120,507 firm-year observations from 
16,525 unique firms across 52 countries during the period 
1990–2006. We also construct a subsample to test the valu-
ation impact of creditor rights using the approach of Fama 
and French (1998). Because this method requires a five-year 
period of firm-specific data, this subsample contains 67,331 
firm-year observations from 12,052 unique firms across 50 
countries during the period 1992–2004.
2.2. Variables
In this section, we define all the variables used in our 
empirical tests. Since most variables are from accounting 
statements, data items shown in the parentheses apply to 
Compustat Global Industrial file, unless otherwise stated. 
We describe our dependent and independent variables in 
the following subsections.
2.2.1. Dependent variables
We examine the impact of creditor rights on the proba-
bility of paying dividends and on dividend amounts us-
ing logit, Tobit, and ordinary least squares (OLS) specifi-
cations. For the logit models, we create a dividend-payer 
dummy, PAYER, which equals one if total dividends paid 
(data 34) are positive, and zero otherwise. For the Tobit 
specifications, we measure dividend amounts, DIV_TO_
S, by scaling total dividends paid (data 34) by sales (data 
1).7 We scale dividends by sales instead of earnings for two 
reasons. First, when earnings are negative, the payout ra-
tio becomes meaningless. Although eliminating firm-years 
with negative-earnings solves this problem, such remedy 
reduces the sample size by more than 7.5%. Second, Leuz, 
Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) find that earnings manage-
ment varies internationally and the scope of earnings man-
agement is negatively correlated to the strength of investor 
rights. Therefore, for maximum sample size and minimum 
measurement error, we use a sales-scaled payout ratio.8
2.2.2. Independent variables
Our independent variables are grouped into two cate-
gories: country-specific variables and firm-specific vari-
ables. The main country-specific variables are the creditor 
rights index, CR, as well as the individual components of 
this index. The creditor rights index is computed by sum-
ming four dummy variables. The first dummy variable, 
NO_AUTOSTAY, equals one if there is no automatic stay 
on assets, and zero otherwise. The second dummy vari-
able, SECURED_FIRST, equals one if secured creditors are 
given the absolute priority claims during bankruptcy. SE-
CURED_FIRST equals zero if government or employee 
claims have higher priority than those of secured creditors. 
The third dummy variable, RESTRICT_REORG, equals 
one if management cannot file for reorganization unilater-
ally. RESTRICT_REORG equals zero if creditor consent is 
not required to file for reorganization. The fourth dummy 
variable, MGMT_NOT_STAY, equals one if either creditors 
or courts can change the incumbent management during 
bankruptcy proceedings. If management has the power to 
remain in charge during bankruptcy proceedings, then we 
set MGMT_NOT_STAY equal to zero.9
Our other country-specific measures include share-
holder rights, civil law origin dummy, the rule of law, ac-
counting standards, and financial development indicators. 
The shareholder rights index, AD, measures the strength 
of control rights granted by law to the minority share-
holders.10 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) rule of 
6 We eliminate utilities and financial firms with two-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes of 22 and 52, respectively.
7 We supplement any missing items for dividends paid (data 34) with the total amount of dividends paid during the fiscal year from the issues file.
8 We re-run all tests using the reduced sample with dividends scaled by earnings and with dividends scaled by cash flows. Our results are similar 
to those reported herein for dividends scaled by sales.
9 Our findings and conclusions are robust to using Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2006) definition of bankruptcy-cost efficiency as a proxy 
for creditor rights.
10 Similar to the creditor rights index, the shareholder rights index is an accumulation of six dummy variables corresponding to various aspects 
of control rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998). As a robustness check, we also use La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
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law index captures the degree to which citizens have con-
fidence in, and are bounded by, the rules of their society. 
This index includes “perceptions of the incidence of crime, 
the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and 
the enforceability of contracts”. We use two dummy vari-
ables to measure accounting standards. Our low account-
ing standards dummy equals one if the disclosure score of 
the firm’s country is in the bottom global quartile, other-
wise zero. Our high accounting standards dummy equals 
one if the disclosure score of the firm’s country is in the top 
global quartile, otherwise zero.
Following Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996), we use two 
measures of financial development. The first measure cap-
tures stock market development and is computed by averag-
ing standardized values of market capitalization to gross do-
mestic product (GDP), total value traded to GDP, and total 
value traded to market capitalization ratios. The second mea-
sure captures financial intermediary development and equals 
the average of standardized values of liquid liabilities to GDP 
and domestic credit for private firms to GDP ratios.11
We use six variables to control for firm-specific char-
acteristics. These widely used controls include retained 
earnings (RE), equity ratio (TE), profitability (ROA), sales 
growth (SGR), market capitalization (LOGSIZE), and cash 
holdings (CASH). RE is the retained earnings (data 131) di-
vided by the book value of assets (data 89); TE is sharehold-
ers’ equity (data 135) scaled by book value of assets (data 
89); ROA is net income (data 32) scaled by book value of 
assets (data 89); SGR is the logarithmic sales growth com-
puted as log(data 1t/data 1t−1); LOGSIZE is the natural log-
arithm of the market value of equity computed at the fiscal-
year end in billions $US; and CASH equals the cash balance 
(data 61) scaled by book value of assets (data 89). All of our 
firm-specific variables are computed at fiscal year-end. The 
predicted signs between our firm-specific variables and 
dividends are as follows: retained earnings ( + ), equity-ra-
tio ( + /−), profitability ( + ), sales growth (−), market capi-
talization ( + ), and cash holdings ( + /−).12
3. Empirical results
3.1. Summary statistics
We provide summary statistics for the main sample in 
Panel A of Table 1. The mean value for our payer dummy 
variable is 64.40%, suggesting that the sample has a major-
ity of dividend-paying firms. The mean (median) dividend-
to-sales ratio is 1.20% (0.50%). A considerable number of 
firm-years (35,850) contain non-positive retained earnings. 
This finding is consistent with the fact that 35.60% of our 
sample firms do not pay dividends.13 The variation of our 
variables from 5% to 95% of the empirical distribution looks 
reasonable and does not suggest a selection bias. For exam-
ple, our sample includes small firms with assets of $20.96 
million (1000×e−3.865 = $20.96 million) at the 5% breakpoint, 
and large firms with assets of $8.85 billion (1000×e2.180 = 
$8.85 billion) at the 95% breakpoint. Similarly reasonable 
magnitudes apply to the other variables as well.
In Panel B we report the number of firm observations by 
year. The number of firms in our sample increases consid-
erably throughout the 1990s, reaches a peak in 2001, and 
generally declines thereafter. These numbers appear to re-
flect the booming stock market during the 1990s, followed 
by the post-bubble bust around the turn of the century.
In Panel C we present the distribution of firms across in-
dustries. More than half of the firms belong to the manu-
facturing industry. Besides manufacturing, five other in-
dustries have a sample size above 5,000 observations; 
construction (5,392), wholesale trade (7,344), retail trade 
(7,561), information (8,344), and professional, scientific, and 
technical services (5,925). The only industry with less than 
300 observations is the management of companies and en-
terprises category with 89 firm-years.
In Panel D we report the distribution of firms across 
countries. There are 34 civil law countries and 18 common 
law countries in our sample. Consistent with La Porta, Lo-
pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000), firms in com-
mon law countries are more likely to pay dividends than 
firms in civil law countries (78.82% versus 68.55%, respec-
tively). Similarly, firms in common law countries pay larger 
dividends than firms in civil law countries (2.22% versus 
1.53% of sales, respectively). We also note that over half of 
our sample firm-years are from three countries: US (38,684), 
Japan (23,044), and the UK (10,367). This skewness is pres-
ent in most international studies regardless of the data ven-
dor.14 We show that our results are unaffected by the dis-
proportionate presence of US, Japanese, and UK firms in a 
subsequent section.
The results in Panel D highlight the issue raised in our 
introduction. Australia, the UK, and Canada are all com-
mon law countries with similar shareholder rights but dis-
similar creditor rights. In the countries with the stronger 
Shleifer (2006) ex ante and ex post investor protection measures and Djankov, La Porta, Lopex-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) anti-self-dealing 
index as proxies for shareholder rights. Our creditor rights findings are unaffected by these alternative proxies.
11 Consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996), we standardize each component of the development measures by dividing the demeaned 
variable by the absolute value of the global average of that variable.
12 DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) argue that predicted signs for equity-ratios and cash holdings are ambiguous. A firm with a low equity 
ratio might be in financial trouble and therefore not pay dividends. A firm with a high equity ratio might not pay dividends because it is a start-
up firm. Similarly, firms can have high cash holdings due to accumulated free cash flows, or due to the need to finance future growth. In the first 
case, firms are likely to pay dividends and in the second they are not.
13 This is consistent with the life-cycle explanation of dividends of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006), and 
Denis and Osobov (2008).
14 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000), for example, extract their data from Worldscope, and Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Ser-
vaes (2003) use Compustat Global. Both studies have a similarly disproportionate number of observations from the U.S., UK, and Japan.
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Table 1. Summary statistics.
Panels A and B show the summary statistics for the overall sample and annual number of observations. Panel C shows the industry breakdown 
of the sample and Panel D shows the country level shareholder and creditor rights (as of 2006), proportion of payers, and mean dividend-to-sales 
ratio. The sample period is 1990–2006. PAYERt equals one if the firm pays dividends (data 34>0), otherwise equals zero. DIV_TO_St is the ratio 
of dividends (data 34) to sales (data 1). REt is retained earnings (data 131) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). TEt is the shareholders’ 
equity (data 135) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). ROAt is net income (data 32) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). SGRt is the 
logarithmic sales growth computed as log (data 1t/data 1t−1). LOGSIZEt is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets (data 89) in billions 
of $US. CASHt is the cash balance (data 61) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). CR and AD are the creditor and shareholder rights from 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), respectively.
Panel A: Firm-specific data
Variable N ≤ 0             N   Mean Median 5%                         25% 75%        95%
PAYERt – 120,507 0.644 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
DIV_TO_St – 120,507 0.012 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.061
REt 35,850 120,507 0.068 0.097 −0.853 0.000 0.249 0.505
TEt – 120,507 0.423 0.421 0.056 0.282 0.566 0.780
ROAt 29,360 120,507 0.015 0.028 −0.227 0.001 0.061 0.131
SGRt 40,306 120,507 0.087 0.075 −0.320 −0.048 0.200 0.580
LOGSIZEt – 120,507 −1.024 −1.104 −3.865 −2.266 0.157 2.180
CASHt – 120,507 0.080 0.052 0.001 0.018 0.116 0.287
Panel B: Annual number of observations
Year N Year N Year N Year N Year N Year N
1990 3,887 1993 4,622 1996 6,670 1999 9,490 2002 9,751 2005 6,653
1991 4,098 1994 5,387 1997 7,779 2000 9,677 2003 9,529 2006 5,732
1992 4,265 1995 6,072 1998 9,292 2001 9,804 2004 7,799  
Panel C: Industry distribution
NAICS Industry definition Two-digit NAICS code N
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 11 1,047
Mining 21 4,782 
Construction 23 5,392 
Manufacturing 31–33 64,750 
Wholesale trade 42 7,344 
Retail trade 44–45 7,561 
Transportation and warehousing 48–49 5,095 
Information 51 8,344 
Real estate and rental and leasing 53 1,834 
Professional, scientific, and technical services 54 5,925 
Management of companies and enterprises 55 89 
Administrative and support and waste management 56 2,185 
Educational services 61 347 
Health care and social assistance 62 1,554 
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 71 1,019 
Accommodation and food services 72 2,786 
Other services (except public administration) 81 453 
Total  120,507  
  
Panel D: Country-level data
Country N AD CR PAYER (%) DIV_TO_S (%)  
Australia 2,760 4 3 81.52 2.95
Canada 4,990 4 1 46.45 1.08
Ghana 4 5 1 75.00 3.01  
Hong Kong, China 984 5 4 66.16 2.49  
India 504 5 2 88.89 2.28  
Ireland 477 4 1 81.55 1.43  
Israel 259 4 3 50.97 1.43  
Kenya 10 4 4 80.00 3.21 
Malaysia 4,921 5 3 66.10 1.55  
New Zealand 365 4 4 81.37 3.02  
Pakistan 158 4 1 78.48 2.97  
Singapore 2,665 5 3 75.01 1.92  
South Africa 769 5 3 84.01 2.19  
Sri Lanka 15 4 2 100.00 1.28  
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creditor rights, Australia (three) and the UK (four), 81.52 
and 86.60% of firms pay dividends, respectively, while the 
median dividend-to-sales ratios are 2.95% and 2.26%, re-
spectively. In Canada, with a low creditor rights score of 
one, only 46.45% of firms pay dividends and the median 
dividend-to-sales ratio is 1.08%. This anecdotal evidence is 
consistent with our hypothesized relation between creditor 
rights and dividend payouts.
3.2. Creditor rights and dividend payouts
In this section, we examine the relation between credi-
tor rights and two dividend policy variables: (1) the likeli-
hood of paying dividends and (2) the amount of dividends 
paid. We present the results of logit, Tobit, and OLS regres-
sions including control variables motivated by previous 
research.15
3.2.1. Multivariate logit analysis: creditor rights and the propen-
sity to pay
In Table 2 we present our logit results based on unadjusted 
industry data. Our logit model is specified as follows (with 
firm subscripts suppressed):
Prob(Payert = 1) 
             = F(1 + 2REt + 3TEt + 4ROAt + 5SGRt  
             + 6LOGSIZEt + 7CASHt + 8AD + 9CRt)             (1)
15 We examine the stability of our results by replicating the estimations on various winsorized samples including 1%, 5%, and 10%. The statistical 
and economic significance of our coefficients is very similar in each set of replications, suggesting that outliers do not drive our results. We re-
port all results based on 5% winsorization.
Table 1 (continued).
Country N AD CR PAYER (%) DIV_TO_S (%) 
Thailand 1,488 4 2 49.80 1.71  
United Kingdom 10,367 5 4 86.60 2.26  
United States 38,684 3 1 42.80 0.78  
Zimbabwe 24 4 4 79.17 2.91 
Common law median 636 4 3 78.82 2.22  
      
Argentina 139 3 1 61.87 2.17  
Austria 571 2.5 3 78.81 1.24  
Belgium 713 2 2 75.18 1.55  
China 3,044 1 2 57.03 1.88  
Croatia 12 2.5 3 83.33 2.19  
Czech Republic 42 4 3 33.33 1.00  
Denmark 1,272 4 3 76.10 1.23  
Egypt, Arab Republic 19 2 2 68.42 4.05  
Finland 1,037 3.5 1 81.87 2.08  
France 3,940 3 0 70.71 1.57  
Germany 4,082 2.5 3 67.56 1.15  
Hungary 90 2 1 62.22 1.30  
Indonesia 1,301 4 2 48.81 1.34  
Italy 1,306 2.5 2 68.68 1.51  
Japan 23,044 3.5 2 86.30 0.63  
Jordan 13 1 1 92.31 5.04  
Republic of Korea 1,157 3.5 3 76.66 0.93  
Mexico 413 3 0 48.43 0.96  
Morocco 8 2 1 100.00 3.79  
Netherlands 1,465 3 3 78.02 1.46  
Norway 1,011 3.5 2 62.91 1.68  
Panama 48 2 4 87.50 2.84  
Peru 72 3.5 0 68.06 2.30  
Philippines 437 3 1 40.96 1.32  
Poland 125 2 1 38.40 0.74  
Portugal 301 2.5 1 67.44 1.52  
Romania 5 5 1 20.00 0.08  
Russian Federation 82 4 2 78.05 1.54  
Slovak Republic 25 3 2 44.00 0.93  
Spain 1,001 5 2 74.93 2.08  
Sweden 1,866 3.5 1 68.97 1.69  
Switzerland 1,656 3 1 76.39 1.54  
Taiwan, China 598 3 2 42.81 1.11  
Turkey 168 2 2 57.74 2.03  
Civil law median 504 3 2 68.55 1.53  
Sample median 538 3.5 2 72.82 1.56   
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where Payer takes the value of one if the firm (index sup-
pressed) paid a dividend in year t, and zero otherwise. All 
other variables are described above. We estimate four vari-
ations of regression Eq. (1) and report the results in col-
umns 1–4 of Table 2, respectively.
In Model 1 we estimate the likelihood of paying divi-
dends as a function of creditor rights alone. The estimated 
coefficient of 0.52404 for the creditor rights index is posi-
tive and highly significant, consistent with the substitute 
hypothesis. The likelihood of paying dividends increases 
with creditor rights; that is, weak creditor rights lead man-
agers to substitute restrictive dividend policies for poor 
creditor protection.
In Model 2 we include firm-specific control variables, 
as well as a country-level shareholder rights index. The re-
sults show that firms with higher retained earnings, prof-
itability, and market capitalizations are more likely to pay 
dividends, consistent with expectations. In addition, firms 
with  higher equity-to-asset ratios, sales growth, and 
cash holding are less likely to pay dividends. The signs 
of these control variables are also consistent with expecta-
tions. Similar to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (2000) findings related to the outcome hypothesis, 
we find a positive and significant relation between share-
holder rights and the likelihood of paying dividends. Our 
main variable of interest, creditor rights, has a positive 
and highly significant coefficient of 0.58004. This coeffi-
cient is 2.8 times the magnitude of the shareholder rights 
coefficient of 0.20711. We also note that the Pseudo-R2 for 
Model 2 is 27.40%, a substantial increase from Model 1’s 
5.30%.
In Model 3 we examine the relation between the likeli-
hood of dividend payments and creditor rights after con-
trolling year fixed effects, along with our other control 
variables. In Model 4 we add industry fixed effects.16 The 
empirical results from Models 3 and 4 are quite similar to 
those from Model 2. That is, firms with higher retained 
earnings, profitability, and market capitalizations are more 
likely to pay dividends, while firms with higher equity-to-
asset ratios, sales growth, and cash holdings are less likely 
to pay dividends. We find a positive and significant rela-
tion between shareholder rights and the likelihood of pay-
ing dividends in both regressions, consistent with La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) outcome hy-
pothesis. More importantly, the creditor rights coefficient is 
always positive and highly significant.
Overall, our Table 2 results confirm the substitute hy-
pothesis with respect to the agency costs of debt, creditor 
rights, and dividend policy. We also find evidence sup-
portive of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(2000) outcome hypothesis for the agency costs of equity, 
shareholder rights, and dividend policy. The highly sig-
nificant creditor rights and shareholder rights coefficients 
in Models 2, 3, and 4, suggest that agency costs of both 
debt and equity play important, yet distinct, roles in shap-
ing corporate dividend policy. Between the two, however, 
creditor rights has a larger impact on dividend policy.
3.2.2. Economic significance of creditor rights and the propensity 
to pay
We explicitly analyze the economic significance of these re-
sults in Figure 1. In the upper graph, we plot the predicted 
probabilities of paying dividends against creditor rights 
based on the full logit model (Model 4) from Table 2. We 
evaluate all independent variables at their sample medi-
ans and evaluate the fixed effects for the year 2006 and the 
manufacturing industry.17 All else equal, the probability of 
paying dividends increases from 54% to 92% as the creditor 
rights index changes from zero to four. A typical firm from 
16 In addition to industry fixed effects, we also adjust all firm-specific variables following the method of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (2000) in order to account for any confounding effects attributable to industry differences. First, we compute the industry median for 
each variable at the country level. Second, we compute the median value of these first-stage medians across all countries. Third, we subtract the 
global industry median from each variable of interest. We then re-estimate our logit Eq. (1) using these industry-adjusted data. The results are 
consistent with those reported in Table 2.
17 We also evaluate all independent variables at their sample medians and evaluate the year and industry fixed effects using alternative years and 
industries. Our results are not sensitive to the choice of year or industry fixed effects.
Table 2. Creditor rights and the likelihood of paying dividends.
This table presents the pooled fixed-effect logit regression results with 
firm-level clustered errors. Sample period is 1990–2006. The dependent 
variable, PAYERt, equals one if the firm pays dividends (data 34>0), 
otherwise equals zero. REt is retained earnings (data 131) scaled by the 
book value of assets (data 89). TEt is the shareholders’ equity (data 135) 
scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). ROAt is net income (data 
32) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). SGRt is the logarithmic 
sales growth computed as log (data 1t/data 1t−1). LOGSIZEt is the 
natural logarithm of the book value assets (data 89) in billions of $US. 
CASHt is the cash balance (data 61) scaled by the book value of assets 
(data 89). CRt and AD are creditor and shareholder rights from Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (2008), respectively.
Independent variables                      Dependent variable = PAYERt
(Predicted sign)                    (1)                   (2)                    (3)                   (4)
Intercept −0.36103 −0.75887 −0.47316 0.09226
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.706)
REt (+)  2.85445 2.81546 2.69249
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
TEt (+/−)  −0.60367 −0.58516 −0.46108
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ROAt (+)  7.61728 7.48851 7.47994
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SGRt (−)  −0.97462 −0.96546 −0.85727
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
LOGSIZE t (+)  0.32669 0.32863 0.34219
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
CASHt (+/−)  −0.40304 −0.39383 −0.38250
  (0.034) (0.041) (0.050)
AD (+)  0.20711 0.20634 0.22567
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
CRt (+) 0.52404 0.58004 0.58993 0.57329
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.053 0.274 0.277 0.281
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the highest creditor rights environment is over 70% more 
likely to pay dividends than a typical firm from the lowest 
creditor rights environment. Stated differently, a reduction 
in the creditor rights index from its highest value to its low-
est value implies a 41% reduction in the probability of pay-
ing a dividend.
In the lower graph, we plot the predicted probabili-
ties of paying dividends against shareholder rights based 
on the full logit model (Model 4) from Table 2. Again, we 
evaluate all independent variables at their sample medi-
ans and evaluate the fixed effects for the year 2006 and the 
manufacturing industry. Comparing the upper and lower 
graphs, we observe that the shareholder rights slope is sub-
stantially flatter than the creditor rights slope. The prob-
ability of paying dividends is less sensitive to changes in 
shareholder rights than to changes in creditor rights. The 
probability of paying dividends increases from 63% to 84% 
as the shareholder rights index changes from its lowest to 
its highest value. A typical firm from the highest share-
holder rights environment is roughly 33% more likely to 
pay dividends than a typical firm from the lowest share-
holder rights environment. Although shareholder rights 
play a significant role in dividend policy, their overall im-
pact is weaker than that of creditor rights.
3.2.3. Multivariate Tobit analysis: creditor rights and dividend 
amounts
After finding that creditor rights increase the probability of 
paying dividends, we turn to the relation between creditor 
rights and dividend amounts. In Table 3, we report the re-
sults of Tobit regressions. Our Tobit model is specified as 
follows (with firm subscripts suppressed):
DIV_TO_St = 1 + 2REt + 3TEt + 4ROAt  
                             + 5SGRt + 6LOGSIZEt + 7CASHt  
                             + 8AD + 9CRt + εt                                     (2)
DIV_TO_St =   {   DIV_TO_St*       if DIV_TO_St* > 0
                       
 
         0                           otherwise
All variables are defined above.
Figure 1. Economic significance of in-sample predictions for the probability of paying dividends. These two figures plot the predicted probabili-
ties of paying dividends for alternative creditor rights (CR) and shareholder rights (AD) indexes using the logit model estimated as Model 4 in Ta-
ble 2. All other independent variables are evaluated at the sample median. Year and industry dummies are evaluated for 2006 and for the manu-
facturing industry.
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The Tobit results for dividend amounts presented in Ta-
ble 3 are similar to the logit results for dividend probabili-
ties presented in Table 2. The estimated coefficient for the 
creditor rights index (0.00533) in Model 1 is positive and 
highly significant, consistent with the substitute hypothe-
sis. The amount of dividends increases with creditor rights, 
suggesting that managers operating in environments with 
weak creditor rights restrict their dividend payouts as a 
substitute governance mechanism.
In Model 2 we include firm-specific control variables, as 
well as a country-level shareholder rights index. There is a 
positive and significant relation between dividend amounts 
and retained earnings, equity-to-asset ratios, profitability, 
and market capitalizations. There is a negative and signifi-
cant relation between dividend amounts and sales growth 
and cash holdings. The signs of these control variables are 
consistent with expectations. We also confirm La Porta, Lo-
pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) results by find-
ing a positive and significant relation between shareholder 
rights and dividend amounts. More importantly, our cred-
itor rights coefficient (0.00439) is positive and highly sig-
nificant. It is roughly 2.6 times the magnitude of the share-
holder rights coefficient (0.00169).
In Model 3 we examine the relation between dividend 
amounts and creditor rights after controlling year fixed 
effects, along with our other control variables. In Model 
4 we add industry fixed effects. The results from Models 
3 and 4 confirm our findings from Model 2. More specifi-
cally, the control variables conform to expectations (includ-
ing positive and significant shareholder rights coefficients) 
and the creditor rights coefficients are positive and highly 
significant.
Overall, the dividend amount results in Table 3 are con-
sistent with the propensity to pay results in Table 2. Both 
sets of results support the substitute hypothesis. Although 
we find evidence for the outcome hypothesis with respect 
to the agency costs of equity (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000), we find stronger evidence for 
the substitute hypothesis with respect to the agency costs 
of debt.
3.2.4. Economic significance: creditor rights and dividend 
amounts
We examine the economic significance of these results in 
Figure 2. In the upper graph, we plot the predicted divi-
dend payout ratios against creditor rights based on the To-
bit model (Model 4) from Table 3. We evaluate all indepen-
dent variables at their sample medians and evaluate the 
fixed effects for the year 2006 and the manufacturing in-
dustry. All else equal, as the creditor rights index increases 
from zero to four, the predicted payout ratio increases from 
0.78% to 1.98% of firm sales. In relative terms, a change 
from 0.78% to 1.98% implies a 2.5-fold increase in dividend 
payout ratios. Stated differently, a reduction in the creditor 
rights index from its highest value to its lowest value im-
plies a 60% reduction in dividend payout ratios.
In the lower graph, we plot the predicted dividend pay-
out ratios against shareholder rights based on the Tobit 
model (Model 4) from Table 3. Comparing the upper and 
lower graphs, we see that the shareholder rights slope is 
considerably flatter than the creditor rights slope. Divi-
dend payout ratios are clearly less sensitive to changes in 
shareholder rights than to changes in creditor rights. These 
payout ratios increase from 0.99% of firm sales to 1.46% of 
firm sales as the shareholder rights index changes from its 
lowest to its highest value. Dividend payout ratios in the 
highest shareholder rights category are approximately 1.47 
times larger than payout ratios in the lowest shareholder 
rights category.
3.3. Creditor rights components
We also examine the impact of individual components 
of the creditor rights index. As described earlier, the credi-
tor rights index is comprised of four components: NO_AU-
TOSTAY which equals one if there is no automatic stay on 
assets, and zero otherwise; SECURED_FIRST which equals 
one if secured creditors are given the absolute priority dur-
ing bankruptcy, and zero otherwise; RESTRICT_REORG 
which equals one if management cannot file for reorgani-
zation unilaterally, and zero otherwise; and MGMT_NOT_
STAY which equals one if either creditors or courts can 
change the incumbent management during bankruptcy 
proceedings, and zero otherwise. The main purpose of 
Table 3. Creditor rights and dividend amounts.
This table presents the pooled fixed-effect Tobit regression results. 
Sample period is 1990–2006. The dependent variable, DIV_TO_St, 
is the ratio of dividends (data 34) to sales (data 1). REt is retained 
earnings (data 131) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). TEt is 
the shareholders’ equity (data 135) scaled by the book value of assets 
(data 89). ROAt is net income (data 32) scaled by the book value of 
assets (data 89). SGRt is the logarithmic sales growth computed as log 
(data 1t/data 1t−1). LOGSIZEt is the natural logarithm of the book value 
of assets (data 89) in billions of $US. CASHt is the cash balance (data 61) 
scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). CRt and AD are creditor 
and shareholder rights from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) and 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), respectively.
Independent variables Dependent variable = DIV_TO_St
(Predicted sign)                    (1)                    (2)                    (3)                  (4)
Intercept −0.00411 −0.01348 −0.01218 −0.00755
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
REt (+)  0.00937 0.00915 0.01068
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
TEt (+/−)  0.01775 0.01783 0.01573
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ROAt (+)  0.11745 0.11728 0.11721
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SGRt (−)  −0.01017 −0.01026 −0.01081
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
LOGSIZEt (+)  0.00267 0.00266 0.00249
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
CASHt (+/−)  −0.02793 −0.02828 −0.02669
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
AD (+)  0.00169 0.00166 0.00147
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
CRt (+) 0.00533 0.00439 0.00445 0.00451
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes
Right censored 42,862 42,862 42,862 42,862
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this analysis is to examine whether our previous results 
are driven by only one or two components of the index. In 
addition, these results will also provide some information 
about the relative importance of the four components.
In Table 4, we report logit results for each of the cred-
itor rights components. The estimated coefficients for our 
control variables are consistent across all four regressions, 
as well as being consistent with the results in Table 2 and 
Table 3. In regressions 1, 3, and 4, we find a positive and 
significant relation between the propensity to pay divi-
dends and NO_AUTOSTAY (0.91587), RESTRICT_REORG 
(0.77483), and MGMT_NOT_STAY (1.32451), respectively. 
Among these positive coefficients, MGMT_NOT_STAY is 
over 40% larger than NO_AUTOSTAY and over 70% larger 
than RESTRICT_REORG. In regression 2, we find a nega-
tive and significant relation between the propensity to pay 
dividends and SECURED_FIRST (−0.57742). Although this 
is opposite of the predicted sign, we also note that there is 
very little variation in this component. Indeed, 94% of all 
SECURED_FIRST observations take a value of one. For the 
other three creditor rights components, 20.2%, 26.7%, and 
46.5% of their observations take a value of one.
In Table 5, we report Tobit results for the creditor rights 
components. Similar to our Table 4 results, we find a posi-
tive and significant relation between the dividend payout 
amounts and NO_AUTOSTAY (0.0116), RESTRICT_RE-
ORG (0.01034), and MGMT_NOT_STAY (0.0062), respec-
tively, and a negative and significant relation between divi-
dend payouts and SECURED_FIRST (−0.00763). Again, the 
latter result is subject to the caveat that 94% of all observa-
tions take a value of one.
Overall, our results in Table 4 and Table 5 reveal that 
three out of four creditor rights categories are consistent 
with the composite index results in Table 2 and Table 3. The 
evidence supports the substitute hypothesis with respect to 
NO_AUTOSTAY, RESTRICT_REORG, and MGMT_NOT_
STAY. Although it is possible to interpret the SECURED_
FIRST results as supportive of the outcome hypothesis, 
such a conclusion is probably overdrawn given distribu-
tion of the underlying creditor rights variable.
3.4. Additional implications of the substitute hypothesis
In the next three subsections, we further examine the 
testable implications of the substitute hypothesis.18 First, 
Figure 2. Economic significance of in-sample predictions for payout ratios. These two figures plot the predicted dividend-to-sales ratio for alterna-
tive creditor rights (CR) and shareholder rights (AD) indexes using the Tobit model estimated as Model 4 in Table 3. All other independent vari-
ables are evaluated at the sample median. Year and industry dummies are evaluated for 2006 and for the manufacturing industry.
18 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of inquiry.
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we compare the propensity of managers from low credi-
tor rights countries to omit dividend payments relative to 
managers from high creditor rights countries. The substi-
tute hypothesis suggests that managers from low creditor 
rights countries will be more likely to omit dividend pay-
ments whenever debt repayments are in jeopardy. Second, 
we examine the interaction between creditor rights and 
credit quality. The manager of a high-credit-quality firm 
has less need to use restrictive dividend payouts as an al-
ternative governance mechanism (i.e., as a substitute for 
weak creditor rights). We therefore expect that high credit 
quality will reduce the importance of creditor rights on div-
idend payouts. And third, we analyze the interaction be-
tween creditor rights and free cash flows. We posit that the 
relation between creditor rights and dividend payouts will 
be stronger for firms with positive free cash flows.
3.4.1. Creditor rights and dividend omissions
In Table 6, we report the results for dividend omissions. We 
estimate a logit model with the same independent variables 
as described above in Table 2. However, instead of examin-
ing the propensity to pay dividends, we examine the pro-
pensity (or likelihood) to omit dividends. Our dependent 
variable, OMIT, equals one if a dividend-paying firm omits 
a dividend in the current year relative to the previous year. 
According to the substitute hypothesis, managers in coun-
Table 4. Components of creditor rights and the likelihood of paying dividends.
This table presents the pooled fixed-effect logit regression results with firm-level clustered errors. Sample period is 1990–2006.The dependent 
variable, PAYERt, equals one if the firm pays dividends (data 34>0), otherwise equals zero. REt is retained earnings (data 131) scaled by the book 
value of assets (data 89). TEt is the shareholders’ equity (data 135) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). ROAt is net income (data 32) scaled 
by the book value of assets (data 89). SGRt is the logarithmic sales growth computed as log (data 1t/data 1t−1). LOGSIZEt is the natural logarithm 
of the book value of assets (data 89) in billions of $US. CASHt is the cash balance (data 61) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). AD is 
shareholder rights index from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). NO_AUTOSTAY equals one if there is no automatic stay on 
the secured creditors’ assets, otherwise equals zero. SECURED_FIRST equals one if the secured creditors are given the priority of the claims during 
the bankruptcy. RESTRICT_REORG equals one if the management of the firm cannot file for reorganization unilaterally. MGMT_NOT_STAY equals 
one if either creditors or court can change the incumbent management during bankruptcy proceeding.
Independent variables                                                     Dependent variable = PAYERt
(Predicted sign) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.44431 0.33580 0.03368 0.20742
 (0.068) (0.164) (0.892) (0.359)
REt (+) 2.78741 2.62709 2.71819 2.45064
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
TEt (+/−) −0.65759 −0.57058 −0.66511 −0.05282
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.586)
ROAt (+) 6.95682 7.03566 7.17157 7.59890
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SGRt (−) −0.89829 −0.8526 −0.92003 −0.66766
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
LOGSIZEt (+) 0.34189 0.31932 0.33977 0.31691
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
CASHt (+) 0.61539 0.32819 0.27913 −1.26296
 (0.002) (0.098) (0.156) (<0.001)
AD (+) 0.34473 0.58370 0.49682 0.29905
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
NO_AUTOSTAY (+) 0.91587   
 (<0.001)   
SECURED_FIRST (+)  −0.57742  
  (<0.001)  
RESTRICT_REORG (+)   0.77483 
   (<0.001) 
MGMT_NOT_STAY (+)    1.32451
    (<0.001)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.262 0.252 0.258 0.290
                     Sample distribution for components of creditor rights
 NO_AUTOSTAY SECURED_FIRST RESTRICT_REORG MGMT_NOT_STAY
# (%) of observations with value = 0 88,309 7,256 96,209 64,509
 (73.3%) (6.0%) (78.8%) (53.5%)
# (%) of observations with value = 1 32,198 113,251 24,298 55,998
 (26.7%) (94.0%) (20.2%) (46.5%)
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tries with weak creditor rights are more likely to omit divi-
dend payments as a substitute governance mechanism. We 
therefore expect a negative relation between creditor rights 
and the likelihood of dividend omissions, all else equal.
In Model 1 the estimated coefficient for the creditor 
rights index (−0.20486) is negative and significant, consis-
tent with expectations. The likelihood that a manager omits 
a dividend payout decreases with creditor rights; that is, 
weak creditor rights increases the probability that a divi-
dend-paying firm omits its dividend payment. In Model 
2 we include firm-specific control variables, as well as a 
country-level shareholder rights index. The estimated co-
efficient for the creditor rights index (−0.13564) is nega-
tive and significant. The Pseudo-R2 value increases from 
0.70% in Model 1 without the control variables to 17.60% in 
Model 2 with the control variables. This increase suggests 
that our control variables have reasonably good explana-
tory power.
In Model 3 we add year fixed effects to Model 2 control 
variables, and in Model 4 we add industry fixed effects. 
The results from Models 3 and 4 confirm our findings from 
Models 1 and 2. Consistent with the substitute hypothesis, 
estimated coefficients for the creditor rights index (−0.12984 
and −0.12739, respectively) are negative and significant. 
Firms that operate in weak creditor rights environments 
are more likely to omit dividends because their managers 
Table 5. Components of creditor rights and dividend amounts.
This table presents the pooled fixed-effect Tobit regression results. Sample period is 1990–2006. The dependent variable, DIV_TO_St, is the ratio 
of dividends (data 34) to sales (data 1). REt is retained earnings (data 131) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). TEt is the shareholders’ 
equity (data 135) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). ROAt is net income (data 32) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). SGRt is the 
logarithmic sales growth computed as log (data 1t/data 1t−1). LOGSIZEt is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets (data 89) in billions of 
$US. CASHt is the cash balance (data 61) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). AD is shareholder rights index from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). NO_AUTOSTAY equals one if there is no automatic stay on the secured creditors’ assets, otherwise equals zero. 
SECURED_FIRST equals one if the secured creditors are given the priority of the claims during the bankruptcy. RESTRICT_REORG equals one if 
the management of the firm cannot file for reorganization unilaterally. MGMT_NOT_STAY equals one if either creditors or court can change the 
incumbent management during bankruptcy proceeding.
Independent variables                                                      Dependent variable=DIV_TO_St
(Predicted sign) (1)   (2)   (3)    (4)
Intercept −0.00240 −0.00542 −0.00623 −0.00971
 (0.026) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
REt (+) 0.01285 0.01123 0.0114 0.00954
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
TEt (+/−) 0.01355 0.01421 0.01381 0.01654
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ROAt (+) 0.10947 0.11558 0.11263 0.12015
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SGRt (−) −0.01139 −0.01104 −0.01173 −0.01011
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
LOGSIZEt (+) 0.00266 0.00245 0.00268 0.00238
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
CASHt(+/−) −0.01425 −0.01826 −0.01894 −0.02882
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
AD (+) 0.00153 0.00519 0.00295 0.00348
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
NO_AUTOSTAY (+) 0.01160   
 (<0.001)   
SECURED_FIRST (+)  −0.00763  
  (<0.001)  
RESTRICT_REORG (+)   0.01034 
   (<0.001) 
MGMT_NOT_STAY (+)    0.00620
    (<0.001)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Right censored 42,862 42,862 42,862 42,862
 
                                       Sample distribution for components of creditor rights
 NO_AUTOSTAY SECURED_FIRST RESTRICT_REORG MGMT_NOT_STAY
# (%) of observations with value=0 88,309 7,256 96,209 64,509
 (73.3%) (6.0%) (78.8%) (53.5%)
# (%) of observations with value=1 32,198 113,251 24,298 55,998
 (26.7%) (94.0%) (20.2%) (46.5%)
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are more sensitive to creditor concerns about debt repay-
ment. These managers use a very restrictive dividend pol-
icy (i.e., omission) to reassure relatively unprotected credi-
tors during times of uncertainty.
3.4.2. Creditor rights, credit quality, and dividend payouts
In Table 7, we report our results for the interaction between 
creditor rights and firm-level credit quality. The substitute 
hypothesis suggests that a high quality credit rating will 
reduce the need to use restrictive dividend payouts as an 
alternative governance mechanism. That is, the interaction 
between creditor rights and credit quality should be nega-
tive. In the first two columns of Table 7, we estimate a logit 
model with the propensity to pay, PAYER, as dependent 
variable. In the second two columns, we estimate a Tobit 
model with dividend amounts as the dependent variable.
Both regression types include our standard indepen-
dent variables plus a credit quality dummy variable, IN-
VGRADE, that equals one if the firm has an (estimated) 
investment grade credit rating and zero otherwise. We con-
struct an investment grade credit rating proxy since credit 
ratings are not available for non-US firms in standard da-
tabases. First, we sample all non-regulated US firms with 
long-term debt between 1990 and 2006 from the Compus-
tat database. Second, we fit a parsimonious logit regression 
with the dependent variable equal to one if the firm has an 
investment grade rating, and zero otherwise. The indepen-
dent variables include the natural logarithm of firm size 
and earnings volatility (i.e., standard deviation of ROA es-
timated over the years t, t−1, t−2, and t−3). Our in-sample 
predictions show that the logit model has strong predictive 
power.19 Last, we apply the estimated coefficients to com-
pute the probability of having an investment grade rating 
for each firm-year observation in the global sample. We set 
the investment grade dummy (INVGRADE) equal to one if 
the estimated probability of an investment grade rating ex-
ceeds 50%, and zero otherwise.20
Our main variable of interest in Table 7 is the in-
teraction between creditor rights and credit quality, 
CR×INVGRADE. As hypothesized, the estimated coefficient 
for CR×INVGRADE (−0.32110) in Model 1 is negative and 
significant. We find a similarly negative and significant co-
efficient (−0.32402) in Model 2 after adding industry fixed 
affects to Model 1’s year fixed effects. These negative inter-
action terms mean that high credit quality reduces the im-
pact of creditor rights on the propensity to pay dividends.21 
We perform a similar analysis for dividend amounts in 
Model 3 with year fixed effects and Model 4 with both year 
and industry fixed effects. The estimated CR×INVGRADE 
coefficients (−0.00342 and −0.00343, respectively) are neg-
ative and significant. Consistent with expectations, credit 
quality acts as a mitigating factor in the creditor rights-div-
idend payout relation.
19 More specifically, our statistical tests for predictive power include the following: Proportion concordant is 93.1%; Somer’s D is 0.869 (Somer’s D 
ranges between −1.0 (worst predictive ability) and 1.0 (best predictive ability)); and c-statistic = 0.934. The c-statistic represents the area under 
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (see Hanley and McNeil, 1982). A higher c-statistic implies stronger predictive power for the 
logistic regression. For example, a value of c = 0.5 implies that the logit model randomly predicts the dependent variable (investment grade rat-
ing) whereas c = 1.0 implies that the logit model perfectly discriminates the dependent variable.
20 We test alternative credit quality proxies and find that our empirical results are robust to the choice of proxy. First, we add leverage, interest 
coverage, and profitability as additional independent variables and get very similar results. None of these models has a stronger predictive abil-
ity than the reported two-variable logit model. Second, since firms with long-term debt ratings are likely to have higher credit quality (Johnson, 
2003) we proxy for credit risk using the presence of long-term debt ratings. More specifically, we fit a logit model where the dependent variable 
equals one if the firm has a Standard and Poor (S&P) credit rating, and zero otherwise. Our results remain virtually unchanged. Last, we fit an 
ordered logit model where the dependent variable has four ordered ratings (A, B, C or D, and no rating) and find similar results as well.
21 In Model 1, for example, the coefficient that measures the impact of creditor rights on the propensity to pay dividends when credit quality is 
low (i.e., INVGRADE = 0) is 0.59523. When credit quality is high (i.e., INVGRADE = 1), the impact of creditor rights on the propensity to pay 
dividends is reduced to 0.27413 (i.e., 0.59523–0.32110). The relation between creditor rights and dividend payouts remains positive, but its mag-
nitude is reduced.
Table 6. Creditor rights and likelihood of dividend omissions.
This table presents the pooled fixed-effect logit regression results with 
firm-level clustered errors. Sample period is 1991–2006. The dependent 
variable, OMITt, equals one if the firm omits a dividend payment (data 
34) in the current year relative to the previous year. OMITt equals zero 
if the firm continues to pay dividends. REt is retained earnings (data 
131) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). TEt is the shareholders’ 
equity (data 135) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). ROAt is 
net income (data 32) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). SGRt 
is the logarithmic sales growth computed as log (data 1t/data 1t−1). 
LOGSIZEt is the natural logarithm of the book value of assets (data 
89) in billions of $US. CASHt is the cash balance (data 61) scaled by the 
book value of assets (data 89). CRt and AD are creditor and shareholder 
rights from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) and Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), respectively.
Independent variables      Dependent variable = OMITt
(Predicted sign)                 (1)                 (2)                      (3)                    (4)
Intercept −2.23395 −0.53324 −1.16947 −1.49889
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
REt (−)  −1.56269 −1.58144 −1.51300
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
TEt (+/−)  −0.77263 −0.78279 −0.86079
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ROAt (−)  −9.75816 −9.52229 −9.4945
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SGRt (+)  0.07434 0.11045 0.06988
  (0.429) (0.256) (0.474)
LOGSIZEt (−)  −0.34097 −0.33156 −0.33793
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
CASHt (+/−)  −1.64833 −1.62740 −1.59217
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
AD (−)  −0.4171 −0.42224 −0.42705
  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
CRt (−) −0.20486 −0.13564 −0.12984 −0.12739
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Year fixed effects No No Yes   Yes
Industry fixed effects No No No   Yes
Pseudo-R2 0.007 0.176 0.188 0.190
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3.4.3. Creditor rights, free cash flow, and dividend payouts
In Table 8, we investigate the interaction between creditor 
rights and firm-level free cash flows. We follow the same 
format as in Table 7 by estimating two logit regressions for 
the propensity to pay dividends, and two Tobit regressions 
for dividend amounts. The first regression (i.e., Models 1 
and 3) includes year fixed effects and the second regression 
includes both year and industry fixed effects. In addition to 
our standard control variables, we include a dummy vari-
able for free cash flows, POS_FCF, which equals one if free 
cash flows are positive and zero otherwise. We define free 
cash flow as operating income (data 14) minus interest ex-
pense (data 15) minus income taxes (data 23) plus depre-
ciation and amortization (data 11), all scaled by the book 
value of assets (data 89).
Our main variable of interest is the interaction between 
creditor rights and free cash flows, CR×POS_FCF. In con-
trast to the mitigating effect of credit quality revealed in 
Table 7, we expect that positive free cash flows will exacer-
bate the relation between creditor rights and dividend pay-
outs; that is, we posit a positive and significant coefficient 
for this interaction term.
As hypothesized, the estimated coefficient for CR×POS_
FCF (0.28612) in Model 1 is positive and significant. We also 
find a positive and significant coefficient (0.29462) in Model 
2. The sign and significance levels of these interaction terms 
mean that positive free cash flows increase the impact of 
creditor rights on the propensity to pay dividends.22 We 
perform a similar analysis for dividend amounts in Models 
3 and 4. The estimated CR×POS_FCF coefficients (0.00200 
and 0.00188, respectively) are positive and significant. Con-
sistent with expectations, positive free cash flows increase 
the agency costs of debt and thereby magnify the relation 
between creditor rights and dividend payouts.
3.5. Alternative explanations
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) 
argue that weak creditor rights can impede financial mar-
ket development. Other studies find that the cost of ex-
22 In Model 1, for example, the coefficient that measures the impact of creditor rights on the propensity to pay dividends when free cash flows are 
non-positive (i.e., POS_FCF = 0) is 0.34596. When free cash flows are positive (i.e., POS_FCF = 1), the impact of creditor rights on the propensity 
to pay dividends increases to 0.63208 (i.e., 0.34596 + 0.28612). Free cash flows exacerbate the creditor rights-dividend payout relation.
Table 7. Effect of credit risk on the relation between creditor rights and dividends.
This table presents the pooled fixed-effect logit and Tobit regression results with firm-level clustered errors. Sample period is 1990–2006. The 
dependent variable is PAYERt, in Models 1 and 2. The dependent variable is DIV_TO_St in Model 3 and 4. PAYERt equals one if the firm pays 
dividends (data 34 > 0), otherwise equals zero. DIV_TO_St is the ratio of dividends (data 34) to sales (data 1). REt is retained earnings (data 131) 
scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). TEt is the shareholders’ equity (data 135) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). ROAt is net 
income (data 32) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). SGRt is the logarithmic sales growth computed as log (data 1t/data 1t−1). LOGSIZEt is 
the natural logarithm of the book value of assets (data 89) in billions of $US. CASHt is the cash balance (data 61) scaled by the book value of assets 
(data 89). CRt and AD are creditor and shareholder rights from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2008), respectively. INVGRADEt equals one if the firm has an investment grade synthetic credit rating.
Independent variables                          Dependent variable=PAYERt                                                              Dependent variable=DIV_TO_St
(Predicted sign)                              (1)                                                        (2)                                                  (3)                                                            (4)
Intercept −0.51354 −0.00467 −0.01309 −0.00897
 (<0.001) (0.985) (<0.001) (<0.001)
REt (+) 2.84084 2.71616 0.00968 0.01120
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
TEt (+/−) −0.54308 −0.42210 0.01795 0.01587
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ROAt (+) 7.20773 7.20927 0.11375 0.11369
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SGRt (−) −0.93200 −0.82292 −0.01047 −0.01101
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
LOGSIZEt (+) 0.31236 0.32658 0.00254 0.00239
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
CASHt (+/−) −0.46966 −0.45285 −0.02766 −0.02595
 (0.020) (0.027) (<0.001) (<0.001)
CRt (+) 0.59523 0.57852 0.00475 0.00481
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
AD (+) 0.1951 0.21497 0.00158 0.00139
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
INVGRADEt 0.91153 0.91010 0.00942 0.00921
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
CR×INVGRADEt (−) −0.32110 −0.32402 −0.00342 −0.00343
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes
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ternal financing is higher in financially underdeveloped 
countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998). Khurana, Martin, and Pereira (2006) 
show that poor financial market development encourages 
internal cash savings in order to avoid expensive external 
financing.23 These results suggest an alternative connection 
between creditor rights and dividend policies: weak credi-
tor rights lead to lower financial market development, and 
poor financial market development encourages internal 
cash retention over dividend payouts. We test the valid-
ity of this explanation by examining the impact of dividend 
changes on firm value. Under the alternative explanation, 
dividend increases should generate negative (or less pos-
itive) valuation effects in countries with weak creditor 
rights since larger dividend payouts increase the likelihood 
of expensive external financing.24
This competing hypothesis is similar to the tradeoff hy-
pothesis developed in Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 
(2003). They attempt to distinguish between two compet-
ing hypotheses when explaining why firms in countries with 
weak institutions tend to hold more cash on their balance 
sheets. The agency cost hypothesis asserts that weak institu-
tions allow insiders to extract more private benefits from these 
cash holdings. Since cash is the most liquid asset, it can easily 
be stolen in countries with weak institutions.25 In contrast, the 
tradeoff hypothesis posits that firms in countries with weak 
institutions hold more cash because external financing is rela-
tively expensive. Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003) find 
support for the agency hypothesis by showing that the market 
value of a dollar held as cash is only 65 cents in countries with 
weak institutions. They reject the tradeoff hypothesis since 
holding cash does not appear to be value enhancing.
23 In a related study, Love (2003) shows that financial underdevelopment increases the positive relation between internal funds and investments 
due to strong financial constraints.
24 This argument implicitly assumes that firms do not increase dividend payouts as part of a signaling strategy (i.e., using dividends as a costly 
and therefore credible signal of future profitability). Although recent research suggests that dividends are not used to signal future profitability 
(Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi, and Thaler 2005), the effectiveness of this test will be reduced by the extent to which firms use dividends to signal 
future profitability.
25 Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) highlight an interesting Belgian case that shows just how easy it can be to steal cash from a 
firm. Also supporting this view, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) find a negative relation between shareholder rights and cash holdings.
Table 8. Effect of free cash flow on the relation between creditor rights and dividends.
This table presents the pooled fixed-effect logit and Tobit regression results. Sample period is 1990–2006. The dependent variable is PAYERt in 
Models 1 and 2. The dependent variable is DIV_TO_St in Models 3 and 4. PAYERt equals one if the firm pays dividends (data 34>0), otherwise 
equals zero. DIV_TO_St is the ratio of dividends (data 34) to sales (data 1). REt is retained earnings (data 131) scaled by the book value of assets (data 
89). TEt is the shareholders’ equity (data 135) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). ROAt is net income (data 32) scaled by the book value 
of assets (data 89). SGRt is the logarithmic sales growth computed as log (data 1t/data 1t−1). LOGSIZEt is the natural logarithm of the book value 
of assets (data 89) in billions of $US. CASHt is the cash balance (data 61) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89). CRt and AD are creditor and 
shareholder rights from Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), respectively. POS_FCFt 
equals one if the firm has positive free cash flow. Free cash flow is defined as the operating income (data 14) minus interest expense (data 15) minus 
income taxes (data 23) plus depreciation and amortization (data 11) scaled by the book value of assets (data 89).
Independent variables       Dependent variable=PAYERt                                     Dependent variable=DIV_TO_St
(Predicted sign)                                  (1)                                         (2)                                                (3)                                          (4)
Intercept −0.86082 −0.27410 −0.01233 −0.00792
 (<0.001) (0.271) (<0.001) (<0.001)
REt (+) 2.59860 2.47187 0.00930 0.01074
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
TEt (+/−) −0.44354 −0.30986 0.01819 0.01621
 (<0.001) (0.002) (<0.001) (<0.001)
ROAt (+) 5.45565 5.40055 0.10806 0.10813
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
SGRt (−) −1.04159 −0.93003 −0.01032 −0.01081
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
LOGSIZEt (+) 0.31723 0.33085 0.00294 0.00276
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
CASHt (+/−) −0.42338 −0.40053 −0.02436 −0.02281
 (0.037) (0.051) (<0.001) (<0.001)
CRt (+) 0.31242 0.29057 0.00285 0.00300
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
AD (+) 0.25256 0.27066 0.00193 0.00177
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
POS_FCFt 0.34596 0.34609 −0.00137 −0.00110
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.012) (0.041)
CR×POS_FCFt (+) 0.28612 0.29462 0.00200 0.00188
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes
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In this section, we test a dividend payout version of the 
tradeoff hypothesis by examining whether dividend reduc-
tions (increases) are value enhancing (destroying) for firms 
in countries with poor creditor rights. Following previous 
studies (Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2003; Dittmar, 
Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2006), we use Fama and French 
(1998) empirical specification to model the market value of 
equity. The full model is given as follows:
(3)
All of the variables are scaled by the book value of assets 
(At, data 89) to account for heteroskedasticity. The depen-
dent variable is the market value of equity (Vt) scaled by 
book value of assets.26 The independent variables include 
earnings (Et), interest expense (It), research and develop-
ment (RDt), and dividends (Dt), all scaled by At. Et equals 
net income (data 32) plus interest expense (data 15) plus 
deferred taxes (data 25); RDt equals research and develop-
ment expense (data 52); It equals interest expense (data 15); 
and Dt equals the total amount of dividends (data 34). dXt 
is the difference between Xt and Xt−2 for variable X, and dXt 
+ 2 is the difference between Xt + 2 and Xt. We also include 
a civil law dummy in the regression since La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) show that valua-
tions are lower in civil law counties. The main variable of 
interest is the interaction term between creditor rights and 
the change in dividends (CR(dDt + 2/At)).The coefficient of 
this variable, 16, is predicted to be positive according to 
the (competing) tradeoff hypothesis.
To estimate regression Model 3, we first delete any firm-
years that do not have data in the required fields. This pro-
cess reduces our sample size from 120,507 firm-year ob-
servations to 67,331 firm-year observations. We check for 
biases in the reduced sample by comparing its distribu-
tions across years, industries, and countries to the full sam-
ple distributions in Panels A, B, and C of Table 9. Overall, 
the reduced sample appears to be fairly representative of 
the full sample across years, industries, and countries.
In Table 10, we report Fama–MacBeth (1973) estimations 
for variations on regression Model 3. Due to space limita-
tions, we report only the coefficient estimates for the main 
variable of interest, the interaction term (16). All other coef-
ficient estimates are consistent with prior studies. The mar-
ket value of equity (Vt/At) is positively related to earnings 
(Et/At, dEt + 2/At, dEt + 2/At), changes in the book value of 
assets (dAt/At, dAt + 2/At), research and development (RDt/
At, dRDt/At, dRDt + 2/At), and dividends (Dt/At, dDt/At, 
dDt + 2/At); it is negatively related to interest expense (It/At, 
dIt/At, dIt + 2/At), future changes in market value of equity 
(dVt + 2/At), and the civil law dummy (CIVIL).
The first row of Table 10 presents the mean 16 coeffi-
cient estimate across 13 annual regressions. These mean 
values are negative in each model specification, a finding 
that is inconsistent with the dividend tradeoff hypothesis. 
The second row shows that serial correlation adjusted t-
statistics are all insignificant at conventional levels.27 The 
last four rows provide the annual distributions of 16 co-
efficients. For example, in Model 1, two (seven) of the 13 
annual 16 estimates are negative and significant (insignif-
icant); two (two) of the 13 annual 16 estimates are posi-
tive and significant (insignificant). Overall, we find no ev-
idence in support of the (alternative) dividend tradeoff 
hypothesis.28
3.6. Robustness tests: control variables, subsamples, and model 
specifications
In this section, we subject our previous results to a num-
ber of robustness tests. In Section 3.6.1, we control for 
other institutional features including legal origin, rule of 
law, disclosure quality, and financial development. In Sec-
tion 3.6.2, we allow for the possibility of time-varying firm 
characteristics. In Section 3.6.3, we test whether our re-
sults are driven by the large presence of US, Japanese, and 
UK firms. We also test for confounding effects from coun-
tries adversely affected by the Asian currency crisis. In Sec-
tion 3.6.4, we re-estimate our results using Fama and Mac-
Beth (1973) approach. And in Section 3.6.5, we re-estimate 
all regression equations using country means. Overall, we 
attempt to ensure that the positive and strong relation be-
tween creditor rights and dividends is not due to sample 
selection biases or empirical misspecifications.
3.6.1. Country-specific variables
In this subsection, we test whether previous results are 
driven by omitted institutional features. We consider le-
gal origin, rule of law, accounting standards, and finan-
cial development.29 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
26 Our main findings and conclusions are unchanged using sales or the book value of equity as the scaling variable.
27 We adjust the t-statistics for serial correlation by dividing into two. Since the sample size is 13, this is a conservative adjustment which favors finding 
significant results. An adjustment factor of two implies a mild serial correlation of 0.112. For details of serial correlation adjustment see Petersen (2006).
28 We replicate Table 10 results for each component of the creditor rights index and find no evidence for the competing hypothesis in any of the results.
29 The rule of law index is from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) and measures the law and order tradition in a country. Accounting stan-
dards include two dummy variables. Low accounting standards dummy equals one if the disclosure score of the firm’s country is in the bottom 
global quartile, otherwise zero. High accounting standards dummy equals one if the disclosure score of the firm’s country is in the top global 
quartile, otherwise zero. Accounting disclosure scores are from Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR, 1995). Cap-
ital market development is proxied by two indexes that measure the development of stock markets and financial intermediaries (Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine, 1996). The stock market development index is the average of standardized values of market capitalizations to GDP, total value 
traded to GDP, and total value traded to market capitalization. The financial intermediary development index is the average of standardized 
values of liquid liabilities to GDP, and domestic credit for private firms to GDP.
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Table 9. Reduced and full sample comparison.
This table compares the subsample distribution to the original sample across years, industries, and countries. Panel A compares sample sizes 
between the full sample and the reduced sample. Panel B provides industry comparisons between the full sample and the reduced sample. Panel 
C compares the full and reduced sample distributions across countries.
Panel A: Annual number of observations
Year                    N                         N                Proportion (%)            Year                    N                        N                  Proportion (%)
                    (Subsample)    (Main sample)                                                             (Subsample)    (Main sample) 
1992 3,103 4,265 72.8 1999 6,695 9,490 70.5
1993 3,315 4,622 71.7 2000 6,831 9,677 70.6
1994 3,819 5,387 70.9 2001 6,910 9,804 70.5
1995 4,218 6,072 69.5 2002 6,026 9,751 61.8
1996 4,710 6,670 70.6 2003 5,675 9,529 59.6
1997 5,140 7,779 66.1 2004 4,777 7,799 61.3
1998 6,112 9,292 65.8    
Panel B: Sample distribution across industries
NAICS industry definition                                                                          % Observations                        % Observations   
                                                                                                                              (Subsample)                            (Main sample)   
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 0.9 0.9   
Mining 3.7 4.0   
Construction 4.8 4.5   
Manufacturing 55.2 53.7   
Wholesale trade 6.5 6.1   
Retail trade 6.3 6.3   
Transportation and warehousing 4.5 4.2   
Information 5.9 6.9   
Real estate and rental and leasing 1.5 1.5   
Professional, scientific, and technical services 4.1 4.9   
Management of companies and enterprises 0.1 0.1   
Administrative and support and waste management 1.8 1.8   
Educational services 0.3 0.3   
Health care and social assistance 1.3 1.3   
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 0.8 0.8  
Accommodation and food services 2.2 2.3   
Other services (except public administration) 0.4 0.4   
Total 100.0 100.0    
 
Panel C: Sample distribution across countries
Country                                                                                              % Observations                                        % Observations  
                                                                                                                  (Subsample)                                            (Main sample)  
Common law countries     
Australia 2.302 2.290   
Canada 3.876 4.141   
Ghana 0.000 0.003   
Hong Kong 0.918 0.817   
India 0.122 0.418   
Ireland 0.398 0.396   
Israel 0.143 0.215   
Kenya 0.007 0.008   
Malaysia 3.848 4.084   
New Zealand 0.267 0.303   
Pakistan 0.088 0.131   
Singapore 1.953 2.211   
South Africa 0.602 0.638   
Sri Lanka 0.013 0.012   
Thailand 1.179 1.235   
United Kingdom 9.201 8.603   
United States 32.190 32.101   
Zimbabwe 0.013 0.020   
     
Civil law countries     
Argentina 0.059 0.115   
Austria 0.465 0.474   
Belgium 0.472 0.592   
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and Vishny (2000) show that firms from civil law countries 
have lower payout ratios than firms from common law 
countries. Brockman and Unlu (2008) show a significant re-
lation between accounting disclosure quality and dividend 
payouts. Finally, a lack of financial development might en-
courage firms to accumulate more internal funds which, in 
turn, could discourage dividend payments.
The first four rows in Panel A of Table 11 report the co-
efficient estimates for CR after adding a civil law dummy, 
rule of law, accounting standards, and financial develop-
ment measures to the right-hand side of a baseline model 
(e.g., Models 3 and 4 of Table 2 and Table 3). The last row 
reports coefficient estimates for the specifications where all 
controls are included jointly. Overall, the results are very 
robust. In each case, the positive relation between credi-
tor rights and dividends (both in terms of likelihood and 
amounts) is positive and statistically significant. It is un-
likely that previous results are driven by omitted institu-
tional features.30
3.6.2. Time-varying firm characteristics
In this subsection, we re-estimate the empirical specifica-
tions in Panel A by using the annual decile ranks of firm-
specific variables (instead of the variable itself). This helps 
control for possible confounding effects from time-varying 
firm characteristics on the coefficient estimates. As shown 
in Panel B of Table 11, the CR coefficient estimates remain 
positive and significant.
3.6.3. Potential sample biases
This subsection addresses two sample selection issues: 
(1) the uneven distribution of observations among coun-
tries and (2) the occurrence of the East Asian currency 
crisis during our sample period. We create five subsam-
ples and report the results in Panel C of Table 11. The 
first subsample excludes US firms, reducing the sample 
size by 32.1%. The second and third subsamples exclude 
Japanese and UK firms, reducing the sample size by 
19.1% and 8.6%, respectively. The fourth subsample ex-
cludes firms from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand, which account for 6.8% of our total sam-
ple. Finally, we exclude all of the countries mentioned 
above. The results in Panel C of Table 11 show that the 
positive and significant relation between creditor rights 
and dividend payouts is robust with respect to all of our 
subsamples.
Table 9 (continued).
Panel C: Sample distribution across countries
Country                                                                                              % Observations                                        % Observations  
                                                                                                                  (Subsample)                                            (Main sample) 
China 0.982 2.526   
Croatia 0.006 0.010   
Czech Republic 0.019 0.035   
Denmark 0.885 1.056   
Egypt, Arab Republic 0.006 0.016   
Finland 0.869 0.861   
France 2.430 3.270   
Germany 3.175 3.387   
Hungary 0.049 0.075   
Indonesia 1.046 1.080   
Italy 0.910 1.084   
Japan 24.296 19.123   
Jordan 0.006 0.011   
Republic of Korea 0.683 0.960   
Mexico 0.215 0.343   
Morocco 0.001 0.007   
Netherlands 0.982 1.216   
Norway 0.728 0.839   
Panama 0.039 0.040   
Peru 0.037 0.060   
Philippines 0.208 0.363   
Poland 0.052 0.104   
Portugal 0.183 0.250   
Romania 0.000 0.004   
Russian Federation 0.033 0.068   
Slovak Republic 0.016 0.021   
Spain 0.814 0.831   
Sweden 1.408 1.548   
Switzerland 1.319 1.374   
Taiwan, China 0.391 0.496   
Turkey 0.095 0.139    
 
30 As an additional robustness test, we re-run these model specifications after deleting observations from countries in the lowest quartile of stock 
market development and the lowest quartile of financial intermediation (as defined in Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996). Our conclusions are 
unchanged. 
Di v iD e n D Po l i c y, cr eD i to r ri g h ts,  an D th e ag en c y co s ts o f De bt   295
3.6.4. Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions
In Panel D of Table 11, we report the CR coefficient esti-
mates using Fama and MacBeth (1973) method. The first 
two rows report average coefficient estimates and corre-
sponding p-values. Consistent with prior analyses, we find 
that the average of 17 (annual) coefficient estimates is pos-
itive, significant, and similar in magnitude to that of the 
pooled regressions. The distribution of the annual coef-
ficients also reveals that our statistical significance is not 
driven by serial correlation. As shown in the bottom four 
rows, all of the CR coefficient estimates are positive and 
significant at the 10% level. Overall, the Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) results confirm our earlier pooled cross-sectional 
time-series findings.
Table 10. Creditor rights and dividends valuations.
This table shows the relation between CR and the valuation impact increase in dividends. Sample period is restricted to 1992–2004 since variables 
require two-year lead/lag values. Each specification shown below is estimated annually consistent with the Fama and MacBeth (1973) technique. 
The variables with the coefficients 1 to 15 are adopted from Fama and French (1998). Due to space limitations estimation results are only shown 
for the main coefficient of interest (16).
Vt is the market value of equity computed as price per share (Compustat Issues file item 3) times number of shares outstanding (Compustat Issues 
file item 13) times the exchange rate (where necessary). At is the book value of assets (data 89). Et is net income (data 32) plus interest expense (data 
15) plus deferred taxes (data 25, where available). RDt is research and development expense (data 52, where available). It is the interest expense 
(data 15). Dt is dividends (data 34). dXt implies the difference between Xt and Xt−2 for variable X. dXt+2 implies the difference between Xt+2 and Xt for 
variable X. ε is the error term. CR is creditor rights index. CIVIL equals one if the firm is incorporated in a civil law country, otherwise equals zero.
Summary of results 16 16 16 16
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
Mean of estimated 16 −0.09547 −0.31117 −0.17674 −0.37849
Adjusted t-statistic for the mean (−0.11337) (−0.42423) (−0.20891) (−0.51309)
Number of positive and significanta estimates 2 2 2 2
Number of positive and insignificant estimates 2 2 2 2
Number of negative and significanta estimates 2 2 4 4
Number of negative and insignificant estimates 7 7 5 5
a At 10% level or less.
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Table 11. Additional analyses.
Panel A reports the coefficient for CR in Models 3 and 4 of Table 2 and Table 3 after adding civil law dummy, accounting standards, rule of law, 
and capital market development indexes as additional controls. Rule of law index is from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) and measures 
the extent of law and order tradition in a country. Accounting standards include two dummy variables. Low accounting standards dummy 
equals one if the disclosure score of the firm’s country is in the bottom global quartile, otherwise zero. High accounting standards dummy equals 
one if the disclosure score of the firm’s country is in the top global quartile, otherwise equals zero. Country-level disclosure scores are from the 
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR, 1995). Capital market development is proxied by two indexes that measure the 
development of stock market and financial intermediaries. These measures are computed following Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996). Stock 
market development index is the average of standardized values of market capitalization to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and total value traded 
to market capitalization ratios. Financial intermediary development index is the average of standardized values of liquid liabilities to GDP and 
domestic credit for private firms to GDP ratios. Panel B reports the coefficient estimates for CR for the same specifications in Panel A after adjusting 
for the time-varying firm-characteristics/dividend relation. Each firm-specific independent variable is assigned a decile rank annually and these 
decile ranks are used in the regressions instead of the variable. Panel C reports the coefficient estimates for CR for various subsamples. Panel D 
reports the distribution of CR based on the Fama and MacBeth (1973) technique. Panel E reports the coefficient estimates for CR using country 
means with country-level error clustering and year fixed effects.
Panel A: Coefficient estimates and p-values for CR
Control variables added                                                                                     Empirical model
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4
 Table 2 Table 2 Table 3 Table 3
Civil law dummy only 0.43279 0.42884 0.00391 0.00396
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Rule of law only 0.58268 0.56833 0.00426 0.00433
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Accounting standards only 0.52583 0.50953 0.00262 0.00272
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Capital market development only 0.50443 0.4926 0.00469 0.00472
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
All of the above are added 0.27677 0.2738 0.0025 0.00253
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Panel B: Coefficient estimates and p-values for CR controlling for time-varying firm-characteristics/ dividend relation.
Control variables added                                                                Empirical model (with annual decile ranks)
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4
 Table 2 Table 2 Table 3 Table 3
Civil law dummy only 0.00395 0.00400 0.00395 0.00400
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Rule of law only 0.00464 0.00468 0.00464 0.00468
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Accounting standards only 0.00316 0.00322 0.00316 0.00322
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Capital market development only 0.00480 0.00481 0.00480 0.00481
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
All of the above are added 0.00250 0.00254 0.00250 0.00254
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Panel C: Coefficient estimates and p-values for CR for sample selection biases
Control variables added                                                                                                                                Empirical model
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4
 Table 2 Table 2 Table 3 Table 3
Only US firms are excluded 0.29201 0.26688 0.00220 0.00222
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Only Japanese firms are excluded 0.61394 0.60022 0.00593 0.00594
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Only UK firms are excluded 0.56076 0.54026 0.0041 0.00413
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Only Indonesian, Malaysian, Philippine, and Thai firms are excluded 0.58961 0.57178 0.00431 0.00436
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
All of the above are excluded 0.21788 0.19179 0.00180 0.00173
 (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
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3.6.5. Multivariate analyses using country means
In this subsection, we use annual country-level means of 
the firm-specific variables in our regression equations. Us-
ing country-level averages has two advantages. First, it 
eliminates the disproportionate representation of coun-
tries like the US, UK, and Japan. This mitigates the possi-
bility of our results being driven by a subset of countries, 
in addition to those identified on an ex ante basis in Panel 
C. Second, using country-level means also mitigates poten-
tial problems from within-country correlated residuals. For 
all regressions, we use an OLS framework and include year 
fixed effects with country-level clustered errors.
We report the country-level mean results in Panel E of 
Table 11. Similar to Panels A and B, we include various in-
stitutional features as additional controls. The CR coeffi-
cient estimates are positive and significant at the 10% level 
in all 20 regressions.
In summary, all of the robustness tests confirm our pre-
vious empirical results. Consistent with the substitute hy-
pothesis, there is a positive and significant relation between 
creditor rights and dividend payouts.
4. Conclusion
The international governance literature to date has fo-
cused on conflicts of interest between controlling share-
holders and minority shareholder interests. La Porta, Lo-
pez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000), for example, 
show that strong shareholder rights reduce the agency 
costs of equity by enabling minority shareholders to secure 
high dividend payouts (i.e., the outcome hypothesis). In 
this study, we argue that country-level creditor rights in-
fluence dividend policies around the world by establishing 
the balance of power between debt and equity claimants. 
Creditors demand and managers consent to restrictive div-
idend payouts as a substitute for weak creditor rights since 
both parties have an incentive to minimize the agency costs 
of debt. Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2007) argue that creditors 
maintain control rights over corporate investment policies 
as a second-best solution to the agency costs of debt. Sim-
ilarly, we find that creditors retain control rights over cor-
porate payout policies as a solution to the agency costs of 
debt. Moreover, we show that the degree to which credi-
tors retain control rights over payout policy depends sig-
nificantly on country-level creditor rights.
Our empirical results are based on an international sam-
ple of 120,507 firm-year observations from 16,525 unique 
firms across 52 countries during the period 1990–2006. We 
examine the impact of creditor rights on the likelihood of 
paying dividends while controlling for firm maturity, le-
verage, profitability, sales growth, size, cash holdings, 
and shareholder rights. As hypothesized, we find a posi-
tive and significant relation between creditor rights and 
the probability of paying dividends. We examine the im-
pact of creditor rights on dividend payout ratios and again 
find a positive and significant relation. Weak creditor rights 
lead to dividend restrictions, consistent with the substitute 
hypothesis.
Table 11 (continued).
Panel D: Estimation results for CR based on Fama and MacBeth (1973)
Statistics for CR for 17 annual regressions                                                       Empirical model
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 3 Model 4
 Table 2 Table 2 Table 3 Table 3
Mean CR 0.72919 0.71687 0.00401 0.00416
p-value for the mean (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Number of positive and significanta estimates 17 17 17 17
Number of positive and insignificant estimates 0 0 0 0
Number of negative and significanta estimates 0 0 0 0
Number of negative and insignificant estimates 0 0 0 0
Panel E: Coefficient estimates and p-values for CR for regressions with country means
Control variables added                                                                                         Empirical model
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3
 Table 2 Table 2 Table 3 Table 3
Civil law dummy only 0.03716 0.03334 0.00153 0.00152
 (0.015) (0.030) (0.026) (0.025)
Rule of law only 0.03078 0.02808 0.00170 0.00168
 (0.027) (0.049) (0.011) (0.011)
Accounting standards only 0.04024 0.03514 0.00171 0.00166
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Capital market development only 0.02783 0.02443 0.00170 0.00172
 (0.052) (0.098) (0.013) (0.011)
All of the above are added 0.03109 0.02881 0.00167 0.00169
 (0.011) (0.026) (0.012) (0.010)
a At 10% level or less.
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We also show that our empirical results are economi-
cally, as well as statistically, significant. A typical firm from 
the highest creditor rights environment is over 70% more 
likely to pay dividends than a typical firm from the low-
est creditor rights environment. Similarly, as the creditor 
rights index increases from zero to four, the predicted pay-
out ratio increases from 0.78% of firm sales to 1.98% of firm 
sales, a 2.5-fold increase in dividend payout ratios.
Next, we extend our analysis in several ways. First, we 
examine the explanatory power of the components of the 
creditor rights index. We find that most of the individual 
components exhibit the same positive relation with dividend 
payouts as the overall creditor rights index, both in terms of 
the propensity to pay as well as payout ratios. Second, we 
test and confirm that firms from weak creditor rights envi-
ronments are more likely to omit a dividend than firms from 
strong creditor rights environments. Third, we show that 
firm-level credit quality reduces, but does not negate, the im-
pact of creditor rights on dividend payouts. Fourth, we hy-
pothesize and confirm that free cash flows intensify the pos-
itive relation between creditor rights and dividend payouts. 
Fifth, we test an alternative explanation for our empirical 
findings; namely, that the positive relation between creditor 
rights and dividend payouts is driven by poor access to ex-
ternal financing. We find no empirical support for this con-
jecture. Lastly, we run a series of robustness tests using ad-
ditional control variables, time-variation in the independent 
variables, sample variations, Fama and MacBeth (1973) and 
country-mean regressions. All of these robustness tests con-
firm a positive and stable relation between creditor rights 
and dividend payout policies.
Overall, our study contributes to the corporate payout 
literature by proposing and confirming a substitute hypoth-
esis based on agency costs of debt. We confirm that creditor 
rights play a significant role in determining dividend poli-
cies around the world. The weaker the country’s creditor 
rights, the more likely it is that firms will restrict dividend 
payouts as a substitute bonding mechanism. Our results 
also contribute to the nascent literature on creditor control 
rights. Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2007) find that creditors ex-
ert control over corporate investment policies, and Roberts 
and Sufi (2007) find that creditors exert control over financ-
ing policies. Our results contribute to this growing body of 
research by showing that creditors exercise substantial con-
trol over dividend policies.
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